MCIB
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Bord Imscrúdú Taismí Muirí

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE GROUNDING OF *'FV SEAN ANTHONY'* AT KINSALE HARBOUR, ON 10th APRIL 2016

REPORT NO. MCIB/255
(No.3 OF 2017)

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) examines and investigates all types of marine casualties to, or on board, Irish registered vessels worldwide and other vessels in Irish territorial waters and inland waterways.

The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its causes with a view to making recommendations for the avoidance of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life at sea.

The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.

The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime Organisation's Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.

MCIB
Marine Casualty Investigation Board

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REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE GROUNDING OF *'FV SEAN ANTHONY'* AT KINSALE HARBOUR, ON 10th APRIL 2016

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March, 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

REPORT NO. MCIB/255
(No.3 OF 2017)

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CONTENTS

1. SUMMARY

The *'FV Sean Anthony'* departed from Kinsale on the 5th April 2016 to fish in grounds approximately 25 miles south west of Kinsale, close to the Kinsale Gas Field. The vessel ceased fishing on the 10th April 2016, due to adverse weather conditions, and was returning to port when it lost power. The vessel was washed onto rocks at the western side of the entrance to Kinsale Harbour, almost due west of Lower Cove. Shortly before grounding the Skipper issued a Mayday call and alerted the Irish Coast Guard. The RNLI at Kinsale was tasked to the scene and arrived within a short space of time. All three crewmembers were rescued. No pollution occurred.

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2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Vessel Characteristics

2.1.1 The vessel is a steel hulled beam trawler built in Holland. The fore deck area is protected by a full shelter deck. Net beams are located amidships. The wheelhouse, machinery spaces and accommodation are located aft.

2.1.2 Principal Particulars

Name:	*'FV Sean Anthony'*.
Flag:	Ireland.
Port of Registry:	Skibbereen.
Year:	1987, Holland.
Fishing Number:	S 628.
Length Overall:	20.04 metres (m).
Registered Length:	16.99 m.
Beam:	6.20 m.
Draft:	3.70 m (Approximately).
Gross Tonnage:	68.
Engine Rating:	221 kW.
Type:	Beam Trawler.
Fishing Category:	Beamer.
Owner:	Dehinder Marine Ltd., Union Hall, Co. Cork.
Crew:	Three including the Skipper. The boat was configured for carrying five crew.

2.2 Voyage Particulars

2.2.1 The vessel departed from Kinsale on the 5th April 2016. The vessel was returning to port on the 10th April 2016, when the incident occurred.

2.2.2 It was normal practice for the vessel to leave its beams deployed until it reached sheltered waters. Once in sheltered waters the beams were raised and secured before proceeding inwards.

2.2.3 The vessel approached Kinsale Harbour from the south west. On passing the light buoy marking the Bulman Rock, the vessel reduced speed in preparation for securing the gear. Weather at the time was reported as south easterly winds of Beaufort Force 9 (see Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report).

2.2.4 The engine suddenly stopped and it was necessary to enter the engine room to restart the engine before returning to the bridge to engage the clutch for drive. The engine started readily but cut out as soon as the gears were engaged. Four attempts were made to restore drive but each failed.

2.2.5 The vessel was drifting to the western shore of the harbour entrance and grounded at approximately 17.10 hrs. The Skipper issued a Mayday call by VHF radio. The Digital Selective Calling (DSC) was not used. Communications between the vessel and the Irish Coast Guard indicate there was a language or communication issue. The location of the vessel was identified using the Automatic Identification System (AIS).

2.3 Type of Casualty

2.3.1 This was a very serious marine casualty. Whilst there was no personal injury, loss of life or pollution, the vessel was not recoverable.

2.4 Shore Response

2.4.1 The time line of the shore response is set out at Appendix 7.2.

2.4.2 The response time was very short with the crew being rescued within 17 minutes of the alarm being raised. The crew were evacuated from the vessel and brought to the nearest pier, at Kinsale.

2.4.4 No lives were lost. No pollution occurred. The owner organised removal of approximately 11,000 litres of Gas Oil from the vessel. The oil was pumped ashore and transferred overland to receiving units. The vessel was to be cut up on the beach and sections removed overland for disposal.

3. NARRATIVE

3.1 The vessel has two derricks mounted at the aft end of the forecastle. These are used to place two large beams over each side with nets attached. The beams drag along the seabed when fishing. All winch controls are in the wheelhouse (hydraulic operation). There are four sets of wires, two derrick hoists and two Gilsen winches for deploying and recovering the trawl net and beams. The Skipper had worked on a Kilmore Quay vessel before taking command of the *'FV Sean Anthony'*. The 'dolly' ropes were approximately one fathom in length and doubled over. The strands were deliberately unwound.

3.2 The vessel had departed from Kinsale in or around 18.00 hrs on the 5th April 2016. They worked a watch system of three hours off and six hours on. The vessel, a beam trawler, fished for mixed catch.

3.3 There were three persons on-board. The Skipper of the vessel held a Portuguese Certificate of Competency (not sighted). He had been a Skipper in Portugal since 2001. He came to Ireland in 2003 and worked on-board Kilmore Quay based vessels as crew and as Skipper. He joined the current vessel in January 2016 as Skipper. The senior crewmember held a Bord Iascaigh Mhara Safety Training Certificate, KO 5937 issued in March 2016. The third crewmember had no certification.

3.4 It was common practice for the vessel to leave the nets and beams at ten fathoms (60 feet) whilst steaming towards port, which assisted in reducing the roll of the vessel. Once in sheltered waters the beams and nets would be recovered simultaneously.

3.5 The Skipper's watch commenced approximately three hours before the incident occurred. As the vessel passed the Bulman Rock buoy it commenced securing the trawl beams in the arrival position. At the time of the incident the speed of the vessel was around 3.5 knots.

3.6 The vessel was using a Sodena computer linked to a GPS and chart plotter. The charts in use were issued by C-Map of Norway. The radar was operational at the time.

3.7 As the crew were recovering the gear, the engine stopped suddenly. When the engine stopped they made four attempts to restart it. Each time they engaged the clutch the engine stalled. Each attempt to restart the engine required leaving the wheelhouse to enter the engine room as the start controls were in that space.

3.8 When the drive could not be re-engaged the vessel issued a 'Mayday' call at 17.00 hrs. The DSC VHF distress facility was not utilised. They reported to the Coast Guard Radio that they were going on to the rocks. The

position was not initially provided and communication was difficult, possibly due to the crew's level of English. At 17.02 hrs the position was established and the Coast Guard Radio was advised that the vessel had a rope in its propeller, which was the reason that the engine stopped (see Appendix 7.3 Photograph No. 1). The Kinsale RNLI was tasked immediately. The inshore lifeboat arrived on scene at 17.17 hrs. They had rescued all three crewmembers by 17.23 hrs and brought them to the lifeboat station in Kinsale.

3.9 Weather data received from Met Éireann states that the nearest observations station recorded winds from 100° T at 38 knots with 5.3 m wave height for 17.00 hrs.

3.10 The position of the grounding was given as 51° 41.07'N 008° 30.17'W (see Appendix 7.4 Google Earth view of area). This was a short distance south of Money Point or almost due west of Lower Cove. At the time of grounding the vessel had 11,000 litres of Marine Gas Oil and 500 litres of Lubricating Oil on-board.

3.11 The site where the vessel lay aground was examined. The vessel was found lying high and dry on a rocky foreshore of slate (see Appendix 7.3 Photograph No. 2). There was no evidence of pollution. The vessel lay head to south west and heeled over to port at an angle of approximately 30 to 40 degrees. The vessel had a five blade manganese bronze fixed pitch propeller with a nozzle. There was evidence of rope wrapped around the tail shaft between the forward end of the propeller boss and the stern gland. There was no evidence of rope fouling between the blade tips and the stern nozzle. The flat blade rudder lay on the ground at the stern (See Appendix 7. 3 Photograph No. 3).

3.12 Both trawl beams were housed and secured. The port net cod-end was lying on the ground beside the vessel and it was established that the rope tails attached to the net were of the same material that fouled the propeller. The foremast had sheared at its base and lay at an angle to the main support. The propeller had been fouled by the vessel's fishing gear.

3.13 Eventually, tidal action washed the vessel further over the rocks.

4. ANALYSIS

4.1 The vessel has a length overall of 20.04 m, but the registered length is 16.99 m. A vessel of this length does not require any certified officers on-board.

4.2 The vessel had three crewmembers operating it and accommodation for five crewmembers. There is evidence that crewing of the vessel had been reduced from four men (including the Skipper) as per the Articles of Agreement. The vessel had been at sea for five days, with the crew on a six hours on and three hour off watch system. This system, if maintained, could still lead to fatigue of the crew. S.I. 709/2003 European Communities (Workers On Board Sea-Going Fishing Vessels) (Organisation of Working Hours) 2003, clearly stipulates the maximum hours to be spent working and the minimum hours of rest (excluding short breaks) on-board fishing vessels as:

- 14 hours work in a 24 hr period or 72 hrs in any seven day period
- 10 hours rest in a 24 hr period or 77 hrs rest in a seven day period.

4.3 The official log book was not kept up to date. Although the information received indicates the vessel departed from Kinsale on the 5th April 2016, the log book shows it arriving at Kinsale at 03.00 hrs on the 7th April 2016 and departing on the same date at 22.00 hrs.

4.4 The hours that the crew actually worked could not be calculated as two of them have returned to Portugal. However, it would appear that they may have been working 18 hours per day with two periods of three hours rest. This does not take into account time spent working, arriving and departing from port or preparing meals.

4.5 There is a safety need for the crew operating on vessels to have an adequate competence in communicating in English with the rescue and marine authorities. This is set out in Marine Notice 35 of 2010 (see Appendix 7.5 Marine Notice 35 of 2010). In this case the crew did not have an adequate command of English and this caused difficulties communicating with the Coast Guard radio station.

4.6 The vessel was entering port with the wind on its starboard side. The trawl gear had to be secured for arrival in port. When inspected at the grounding site, the main derricks were raised and the beams secured to the bulwark rails by chain. The nets were still in the water and did not appear to have been recovered. The port side net ‘dolly ropes’ fouled the propeller, which may be an indication that they were dragged under the hull as the vessel made leeway.

4.7 A beam trawler, when landing its catch, raises the outrigger derricks so as to bring the cod-end on board connecting a G-clamp from the Gilsen winches to

the bottom of the net. On completion of fishing operation, the net and beams are returned to the water and set at approximately ten fathoms depth for stability purposes. As the vessel approaches the port, the beams and nets are lifted for hauling on-board.

4.8 The evidence indicates that the vessel drifted over the cod-end, because of the wind strength. The 'dolly ropes' attached to the port net cod-end became entangled in the propeller, between the stern tube and the inner end of the propeller boss.

4.9 The propeller entanglement caused the engine to stall, and the associated restriction was such that it was not possible to engage the drive as the entangled rope prevented the drive from engaging thus causing the continuing stalling of the engine.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 No one was injured or lost as a result of the incident. The vessel was not recoverable and was broken up at the site of the grounding.

5.2 No pollution occurred as a result of the incident.

5.3 The rope tails attached to the cod-end of the port trawl net became entangled in the propeller and stopped it from rotating. This in turn stalled the main engine. To restart the engine, it was necessary to leave the wheelhouse and enter the engine room for each attempt. However, the level of entanglement was such that it was not possible to restart the engine. Valuable time was lost in these attempts to restart the engine and find drive. The vessel was in a narrow channel and adrift.

5.4 There was an apparent reluctance to raise the alarm using the DSC facility on the VHF transceiver. If used, the vessel's position would have been known by the Irish Coast Guard immediately and perhaps the response might have been quicker. This also resulted in a lifeboat being tasked needlessly (the Courtmacsherry All Weather Boat). The Skipper opted to issue a 'Mayday' call by voice transmission and the communications level was reported as being poor.

5.5 The current regulations for Irish registered fishing vessels under 17 m in length do not require qualified deck officers on-board.

5.6 There are regulations in place concerning hours of work and rest which do not appear to have been complied with.

5.7 The safe operation of a vessel is dependent on a number of human factors, one of which is the safe manning of the vessel i.e. the number of crew on-board and another is competency i.e. the relevant qualifications of the crew on-board. Without these particular factors being satisfactorily provided for, the enforcement and compliance with hours of work and rest requirements is difficult to achieve.

6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport should:

- Require safe manning standards for all fishing vessels
- Explore the introduction of Certificates of Competency for all fishing vessels

It is noted that these recommendations are actions in the Maritime Safety Strategy. Action Numbers 13 and 14.

7. APPENDICES

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.

MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Dublin 9, Ireland.
Cnoc Ghlas Naíon, Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire.
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Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

Bord Imscrúdu Taisme Mara Marine Casualty Investigation Board 16 MAY 2016

Our Ref. **WS3018/2_16247**
Your Ref. **MCIB/12/255**

17 May 2016

Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area around 51°41.00N 008°30.00W Kinsale, Co Cork, on the 10th April 2016 between 12 hours and 24 hours.

[redacted]

Please find enclosed the above report and copies of the Sea Area Forecasts as issued on 6th April – 10th April 2016. Also enclosed are wave observations from the offshore Kinsale Energy Gas Platform.

Yours sincerely,

[redacted]

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.

MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Dublin 9, Ireland.
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Our Ref. **WS3018/2_16247**
Your Ref. **MCIB/12/255**

Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area around 51°41.00N 008°30.00W Kinsale, Co Cork, on the 10th April 2016 between 12 hours and 24 hours.

General Meteorological Situation: A strong to gale force and gusty east-southeasterly airflow covered the area as a depression of 982 hPa developed approximately 150 nautical miles southwest of Mizen Head. The depression drifted southwestwards and the associated occluded front moved slowly northwards over the area.

Details:

12:00 – 18:00 hours:

Wind:	Strong occasionally gale force (Force 7 or 8) with gusts of 40 to 45 knots from an east-southeasterly direction.
Weather:	Cloudy with persistent rain, heavy at times.
Visibility:	Moderate or poor.
Temperature:	Air: 7 or 8 degrees Celsius.
Sea State*:	Rough or very rough from a southeasterly direction.

Wind:	Strong to gale force (Force 7 or 8) with gusts of 40 to 45 knots from a mainly easterly direction at first. Winds decreased moderate to fresh (Force 4 or 5) by the end of the period.
Weather:	Cloudy with outbreaks of rain, heavy at times. Dry by the end of the period with clear spells.
Visibility:	Moderate or poor in rain, becoming good later.
Temperature:	Air: 6 or 7 degrees Celsius.
Sea State*:	Very rough from a mainly easterly direction with a southeasterly swell at first (a signicicant wave height of 5.6 metres and maximum wave height of 9.4 meters was recorded at the Kinsale Offshore Gas Platform between 18:00 and 19:00 hours). The sea state gradually decreased after 20:00 hours and was mainly rough by the end of the period.

*Sea State: The sea state estimate in this report is derived from computer generated wave data and observations from the Kinsale Energy Gas Platform which lies 30 nautical miles to the south of Kinsale. (Buoy M5 was out of service at the time).

[redacted]

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.

Observations from Kinsale Energy Gas Platform

Date	Wind direction	Wind Speed (knots)	Significant wave height (metres)
10-apr-2016 00:00:00	109	17	2.2
10-apr-2016 01:00:00	107	21	2.2
10-apr-2016 02:00:00	100	26	2.1
10-apr-2016 03:00:00	92	31	2.2
10-apr-2016 04:00:00	100	36	2.7
10-apr-2016 05:00:00	95	39	3.2
10-apr-2016 06:00:00	100	36	3.5
10-apr-2016 07:00:00	121	31	3.9
10-apr-2016 08:00:00	128	30	4.0
10-apr-2016 09:00:00	134	37	4.1
10-apr-2016 10:00:00	130	35	4.8
10-apr-2016 11:00:00	128	38	5.0
10-apr-2016 12:00:00	135	35	5.2
10-apr-2016 13:00:00	136	32	4.7
10-apr-2016 14:00:00	115	42	4.8
10-apr-2016 15:00:00	110	39	4.9
10-apr-2016 16:00:00	107	37	4.9
10-apr-2016 17:00:00	100	38	5.3
10-apr-2016 18:00:00	103	40	5.0
10-apr-2016 19:00:00	106	40	5.2
10-apr-2016 20:00:00	143	24	5.1
10-apr-2016 21:00:00	138	21	5.1
10-apr-2016 22:00:00	133	22	4.7
10-apr-2016 23:00:00	138	17	4.2
11-apr-2016 00:00:00	131	14	3.9

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.

Wave Heights / State of Sea
The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of Significant Wave Heights. The Significant Wave Height is defined as the average height of the highest one-third of the waves. (It is very close to the value of wave height given when making visual observations of wave height.)

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave Height (in meters)
Calm	0 – 0.1
Smooth(Wavelets)	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height

Visibility Descriptions of visibility mean the following:

Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 NM (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 NM (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 NM (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 NM (< 1km)

Beaufort Scale of Wind

Force	Description	Speed* knots	Speed* km/hr	Seastate	Wave height** in metres
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	118+	Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.
**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea. Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.



Appendix 7.2 Timeline.

10.04.16	17.00 hrs	Mayday call on VHF radio received by Cork Coast Guard Radio.
	17.03 hrs	Kinsale RNLI alerted.
	17.12 hrs	Courtmacsherry All Weather Lifeboat alerted.
		Rescue Helicopter R117 tasked.
	17.14 hrs	Kinsale inshore Lifeboat on scene.
	17.17 hrs	Three crew rescued by Kinsale inshore lifeboat.
	17.22 hrs	Courtmacsherry All Weather Lifeboat stood down.
	17.23 hrs	Kinsale inshore vessel back on scene.
	17.32 hrs	R117 on scene.
	17.58 hrs	R117 returning to base.

Appendix 7.3 Photographs.

Photograph No. 1: Rope wrapped around inboard part of propeller.

Photograph No. 2: View of vessel aground.

Appendix 7.3 Photographs.

Photograph No. 3: Rudder lying on rocks beside vessel.

Appendix 7.4 Google Earth view of area and position of the grounding.

Appendix 7.5 Marine Notice 35 of 2010.

Department of Transport
An Roinn Iompair

Marine Notice No. 35 of 2010

NOTICE TO ALL SHIPOWNERS, FISHING VESSEL OWNERS, AGENTS, SHIPMASTERS, SKIPPERS, FISHERMEN, YACHTSMEN AND SEAFARERS

Documents required by a radio operator in order to operate the ship radio station on board an Irish Ship

The Department of Transport wishes to advise that all Irish ships having radio communications or radio navigational equipment, which transmits radio signals, must hold a ship radio licence under the Wireless Telegraphy Acts. This is also a requirement under the International Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunications Union ITU.

The ITU Radio Regulation Article 47.2 specifically lays out the requirement for the operator of a ship to have a recognition or authorisation (Authority To Operate) issued by the administration issuing a ship radio licence, to a ship station. The applicable legislation in Ireland is the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1926; Wireless Telegraphy Act 1972; Communications Regulation Act 2002; and amending legislation, in particular the Wireless Telegraphy (Ship Station Radio Licence) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 414 of 2006)

In order to comply with these regulations, Ireland accepts the following documents as meeting the requirements on board its vessels:

1. An Authority to Operate document issued by the Department of Transport, Ireland. This document may be attached to a radio operator certificate of competency or be a stand-alone document.

2. An Irish Certificate of Equivalent Competency (CEC) or Irish Certificate of Competence (COC) issued by the Department of Transport, Ireland, when such certificate states that the holder has a valid Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), General Operator Certificate (GOC) or Restricted Operator Certificate (ROC) qualification. An Irish CEC or Irish COC **must** be accompanied by the persons separate valid GMDSS, GOC or ROC qualification.

The Radio Regulations stipulate that the Ship Radio Licence issued by a flag state administration has no function if it is not accompanied by at least one radio operator on board the ship with the required documentation as outlined above.

Director General
Maritime Safety Directorate
Department of Transport
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2
29/11/2010

For any technical assistance in relation to this Marine Notice, please contact:
The Marine Survey Office, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2, tel: +353-(0)1-678 3400.
For general enquiries, please contact the Maritime Safety Policy Division, tel: +353-(0)1-678 3418.
Written enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:
Maritime Safety Directorate, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2, Ireland,
email: marinenotices@transport.ie or visit us at: www.transport.ie.

Page 1 of 1

NATURAL JUSTICE - CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 requires that:

"36 (1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such person as appears to the Board best to represent that person's interest.

(2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may, within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the draft.

(3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in which to submit his or her observations on the draft.

(4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.

(5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2), the Board may, at its discretion -

(a) alter the draft before publication or decide not to do so, or

(b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks fit."

The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires amendments to the report that is stated beside the relevant observation. When the Board is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then the observation is 'Noted' without comment or amendment. The Board may make further amendments or observations in light of the responses from the Natural Justice process.

'Noted' does not mean that the Board either agrees or disagrees with the observation.

8. NATURAL JUSTICE - CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

Correspondence 8.1 Coast Guard and MCIB response.



You replied to this message on 25/01/2017 12:52.

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted]
Cc:
Subject: MCIB Draft Report Fv Sean Anthony

[redacted]

Reference draft report F/V Sean Anthony your ref MCIB/12/255

I have no observations

Regards

[redacted]

[redacted]
Coast Guard

Irish Maritime Administration
Department of Transport, Tourism & Sport
Leeson Lane, Dublin 2
[redacted]
w: www.dttas.ie

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

Correspondence 8.2 RNLI and MCIB response.



Lifeboats

Royal National Lifeboat Institution

Chairman: Charles Hunter-Fenn
Chief Executive: Paul Boissier

RNLI (Trading) Ltd 01073377, RNLI (Sales) Ltd 2200240 and RNLI (Enterprises) Ltd 1784300 are all companies registered at West Quay Road, Poole, Dorset, BH15 1HZ

[redacted]
Chairman
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

30th January 2017

Re: Draft report of the investigation into the grounding of the 'FV Sean Anthony' at Kinsale Harbour 10 April 2016

[redacted]

We would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the above investigation however the RNLI have no further comments to make.

Kind regards,

[redacted]

The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea

Charity number CHY 2678 in the Republic of Ireland and registered in England and Wales (209603) and Scotland (SC037736)

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

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